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 Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. United States 
Environmental Protection Agency, 846 F.3d 492 (2d Cir. 2017) 
 
Benjamin Almy 
 
Trout Unlimited’s effort to overturn the EPA’s Water Transfers 
Rule was stifled by the Second Circuit. The court’s comprehensive 
Chevron analysis determined that while the NPDES Water Transfers Rule 
may be at odds with the Clean Water Act’s mission, it was based on a 
reasonable interpretation of the statute’s ambiguous language, and 
therefore it did not violate the Administrative Procedures Act. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit, water transfers are an essential part of the United States’ water-
supply infrastructure, providing many of the nation’s homes, farms, and 
factories with adequate supplies of usable water.1 A water transfer  
“conveys or connects waters of the United States without subjecting those 
waters to any intervening industrial, municipal, or commercial use.”2 
Historically, the United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) 
adhered to an informal position that water transfers were not subject to the 
National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (“NPDES”) permitting 
program under the Clean Water Act (“CWA”).3 This position was codified 
in 2008 when the EPA released the NPDES Water Transfers Rule (“the 
Rule”) which clarified that “water transfers are not subject to regulation 
under the NPDES permitting program.”4 The Rule states that a NPDES 
permit is not required if the water is being transferred from one “water of 
the United States” (“WOTUS”) to another WOTUS because the transfer 
does not result in the “‘addition’ of a pollutant.”5 As a result, if a pollutant 
is present in one body of water and transferred to another, it does not 
equate to an “addition” because the pollutant already existed in “the waters 
of the United States.”6 
Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. United 
States Environmental Protection Agency concerned a challenge by a 
coalition of environmental conservation and sporting organizations as well 
as several state, provincial and tribal governments (collectively 
“Plaintiffs”) to the Rule under the Administrative Procedures Act 
(“APA”), as an “unreasonable interpretation” of the CWA.7 In reviewing 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York’s 
                                                     
1  Catskill Mountains. Chapter. Of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. 
Environmental Protection Agency, 846 F.3d 492, 500 (2d Cir. 2017). 
2  Id. at 503 (quoting 40 C.F.R. § 122.3(i) (2017)).   
3  Id. at 504.  
4  Id. at 504 (quoting 73 Fed. Reg. 33,697 (June 13, 2008)). 
5  Id. (quoting 73 Fed. Reg. 33,699). 
6  Id. at 504-05 (quoting 73 Fed. Reg. 33,699). 
7  Id. at 506.  
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decision, the Second Circuit applied the two-step Chevron analysis to 
determine the Rule’s validity.8 In reversing the decision of the district 
court, the Second Circuit held that the Rule was a reasonable interpretation 
of the CWA and was therefore entitled to Chevron deference.9 
 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 
Congress passed the Clean Water Act in 1972 as a response to the 
growing national concern about pollution in our nation’s waters.10 
Congress’s objective was “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, 
and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”11 The CWA prohibits “the 
discharge of any pollutant by any person” unless compliant under the 
CWA.12 A “discharge” is defined as “any addition of any pollutant into 
navigable” WOTUS from any point source without a permit.13 Section 402 
of the CWA establishes the NPDES permitting program, which requires a 
party to obtain a permit before discharging a pollutant into a navigable 
WOTUS.14 
 
III. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
Throughout the 1990s and 2000s, with the EPA acting under an 
informal position and without the authority granted to formal agency rules 
under Chevron deference, environmental groups and other interested 
parties won several lawsuits challenging the requirement of NPDES 
permits for some water transfers.15 As a result the EPA moved to adopt a 
final rule regarding these water transfers.16 
Following the EPA’s codification of the Rule in 2008, several 
complaints were filed by conservation and sporting organizations in the 
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.17 The 
complaints requested that the district court set aside the Rule as arbitrary 
and capricious and not in accord with the CWA.18 The district court 
granted the EPA’s petition to stay proceedings before it pending a petition 
for review that was being considered by the Eleventh Circuit Court of 
Appeals on a similar challenge.19 On June 4, 2009, the Eleventh Circuit 
upheld the Rule, determining under Chevron that it was based on a 
                                                     
8  Id. at 507 (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
9 Id. at 506.  
10  Id. at 501.  
11 Id. at 502 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2017)). 
12  Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a)).  
13  Id. (quoting 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a), 1362(12)(A), 1362(7)).  
14  Id. 
15  Id. at 504. 
16  Id.   
17  Id. at 505. 
18  Id. 
19  Id. at 506. 
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reasonable interpretation of the CWA.20 Following the Eleventh Circuit’s 
ruling, the district court lifted the stay and proceeded with the case.21 The 
district court, in conducting its own Chevron analysis, held the Rule to be 
an unreasonable interpretation of the CWA. Thus, the district court granted 
the Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgement and vacated the Rule.22  
 
IV. ANALYSIS 
 
On de novo review, the Second Circuit analyzed the district 
court’s summary judgment ruling under the APA’s “arbitrary or 
capricious” standard.23 The court reviewed the district court’s 
determination that the Rule was “manifestly contrary” to the CWA, and 
was therefore an unreasonable interpretation of the CWA.24 The court 
evaluated the Rule within the two-step Chevron framework.25 The two-
step Chevron analysis was developed to evaluate whether an agency’s 
interpretation of a statutory provision is reasonable and not arbitrary, 
capricious or manifestly contrary to the statute.26 
 
a. Chevron Step One 
 
At Chevron Step One, a court must determine “whether Congress 
has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of 
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the 
agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of 
Congress.”27  
However, if a statute is “silent or ambiguous” as to an issue the 
agency is seeking to interpret,28  a court will then determine if the agency 
meets the test set forth in Mead.29 To satisfy the Mead test, there must be 
both a clear congressional delegation of authority to the agency to make 
rules which carry the force of law, and the agency interpretation must be 
promulgated under that given authority.30  
In its analysis of Chevron Step One, the court walked through two 
stages attempting to decipher Congressional intent.31 
First, the court reviewed prior case law to determine whether 
Congressional intent had been discovered in prior rulings.32 Plaintiffs 
                                                     
20  Id. (citing Friends of the Everglades v. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist., 570 
F.3d 1210 (11th Cir. 2009). 
21  Id. 
22  Id.  
23  Id.  
24  Id. at 507. 
25  Id. 
26  Id. at 520-21. 
27  Id. at 507 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43). 
28  Id. at 507 (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843). 
29  United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
30  Id. at 226-27. 
31  Trout Unlimited, 846 F.3d at 508. 
32  Id.  
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argued that the case should be settled at Chevron Step One because the 
court had previously held in Catskill I and Catskill II that no ambiguity 
existed in the CWA’s requirement of NPDES permits for water transfers.33 
In both Catskill I and Catskill II, the issue was a transfer of turbid water, 
which is water carrying high levels of solids in suspension.34 The court in 
both cases held that the transfer of turbid water without an NPDES permit 
violated the CWA because it determined that turbid water was an 
“addition” of a pollutant.35 However, both cases were decided while the 
EPA was still operating under an informal policy, so a Chevron analysis 
was inappropriate because the EPA had not formalized or codified its 
position on the regulation of  water transfers.36 As a result of this 
informality, the court found the prior case law non-binding.37  
Next, Plaintiffs argued that due to the court’s reasoning in Catskill 
I, the term “navigable waters” unambiguously refers to a collection of 
individual waters and not a collective unitary entity.38 However, here, the 
court held that nowhere in its previous rulings had it definitively held that 
the term “navigable waters” could hold only one unambiguous 
interpretation.39 Further, the court held that such a determination would be 
in contrast to an accurate Chevron analysis on a formal agency 
interpretation.40 
Second, the court analyzed the text, structure, and purpose of the 
CWA to determine whether Congress had directly spoken to whether 
NPDES permits are required for water transfers.41 The court concluded 
that “nothing in the language or structure” of the CWA provides a clear 
indication as to whether Congress intended to require NPDES permits for 
water transfers.42 
To conclude the first step of the Chevron analysis, the court 
looked to the CWA’s statutory purpose and legislative history to try and 
deduce Congress’s intent.43 Plaintiffs argued that an exemption for water 
transfers from the NPDES permitting program could result in the transfer 
of water from a heavily polluted body to a unspoiled body, and such an 
outcome would be in direct contrast to the CWA’s main objective.44 The 
court disagreed, holding “Congress’s broad purposes and goals in passing 
                                                     
33  Id. at 508 (citing Catskill Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. 
v. City of New York, 273 F.3d 481 (2d Cir. 2001) [hereinafter Catskill I]; Catskill 
Mountains Chapter of Trout Unlimited, Inc. v. City of New York, 451 F.3d 77 (2d 
Cir. 2006) [hereinafter Catskill II]). 
34  Id.  
35  Id.   
36  Id.   
37  Id.  
38  Id. at 511. 
39  Id. 
40  Id.   
41  Id. at 512.  
42  Id. at 514.  
43  Id.   
44  Id.  
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the CWA do not alone establish that the CWA unambiguously requires 
that water transfers be subject to NPDES permitting.”45 
 
b. Chevron Step Two 
 
At Chevron Step Two, a court must determine whether an agency 
rule is “arbitrary or capricious in substance, or manifestly contrary to the 
statute.”46 
In conducting its Chevron Step Two analysis, the court reviewed 
three aspects of the EPA’s construal of the Rule. Ultimately, the court 
determined that the EPA’s interpretation of the CWA was neither arbitrary 
nor capricious and not manifestly contrary to the statute, and was therefore 
reasonable.47  
First, the court determined that Chevron was the correct legal 
standard to be applied.48 Plaintiffs argued that the court should include the 
more-strict State Farm49 standard into the Chevron Step Two analysis.50 
However, the court reasoned the State Farm standard was inappropriate 
because an agency’s initial interpretation of a statutory provision should 
be analyzed using the Chevron Two Step framework.51 
The court then evaluated the EPA’s reasoning for its interpretation 
of the Rule.52 The court concluded that, while the interpretation was not 
“immune to criticism or counterargument,” it was adequately reasoned to 
pass Chevron’s low bar for agency reasoning underlying an 
interpretation.53 The EPA reasoned that Congress intended to leave 
oversight of water transfers primarily to state authorities to avoid 
interference with states’ ability to effectively allocate water and water 
rights.54 Therefore, the court held that the EPA’s interpretation was not 
arbitrary or capricious.55 
Finally, the court evaluated the reasonableness of the EPA’s 
interpretation.56 Holding that the EPA’s interpretation was reasonable, the 
court cited several reasons justifying their determination.57 The court noted 
                                                     
45  Id. at 515. 
46  Id. at 520 (quoting Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. 
United States, 562 U.S. 44, 53 (2011)).  
47  Id.   
48  Id.  
49  State Farm is used to evaluate whether a rule is procedurally 
defective as a result of flaws in the agency’s decision-making process and is 
appropriate when an agency has changed its interpretation of a statute. Id. at 520 
(citing Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 
(1983)). 
50  Trout Unlimited, 846 F.3d at 521.  
51  Id. at 523. 
52  Id. at 524. 
53  Id.  
54  Id.   
55  Id. at 525.  
56  Id. 
57  Id. at 525-31.  
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Congress’s silent acquiescence to unpermitted water transfers, and 
interpreted its silence as a reflection of intent not to require the imposition 
of NPDES permitting in every possible application.58 The court also 
analyzed the unitary waters theory.59 While not overtly ascribing to the 
theory, the court concluded that the language of the CWA was ambiguous, 
and therefore the EPA’s reading of “navigable waters” in § 402 was 
reasonable enough to be afforded deference.60 
Shifting from its evaluation of the Rule’s reasonableness to its 
economic impacts, the court reasoned that the existence of available 
regulatory alternatives provided different, yet potentially effective, 
options to the NPDES permitting program.61 These state-driven 
alternatives would allow the goals of the CWA to be achieved outside of 
NPDES permitting.62 The court concluded that while it is not up to the 
judiciary to determine the effectiveness of those means, their existence is 
sufficient to deem the EPA’s interpretation of the statute reasonable.63 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
In applying the Chevron Two Step analysis, the court 
acknowledged the validity of the counterarguments to the Rule, but 
ultimately was bound to defer to agency decisionmaking so long as it was 
not arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable. While the Rule may seem at 
odds with the overall goal of the CWA, the EPA’s determination not to 
require NPDES permits for water transfers was not without reason, and it 
was therefore upheld. 
 Landing on the side of practicality over environmental concern, 
this case serves as a stark reminder that Chevron deference does not 
always tilt in favor of politically liberal positions. While often criticized 
by more politically conservative representatives, in practice, the deference 
granted is dependent upon the reasoning of the agency, whose makeup is 
determined by the party in the White House. The life of Chevron deference 
may be waning; however, it is likely that without Chevron, leaving 
determinations of the validity of agency interpretations of statutory 
provisions to judicial analysis rather than agency deference will be 
comparatively neutral from a political perspective. 
 
                                                     
58  Id. at 525.  
59  The unitary waters theory refers to all navigable waters as a singular 
whole. The word “waters” could be interpreted as several different bodies of water 
collectively or as a single body of water; it is the former which the unitary waters 
theory espouses. Id. at 533. 
60  Id. at 527-28.  
61  Id. at 529-31. 
62  Id. at 531.  
63  Id.  
